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Resumo
O crescimento exponencial da jurisdição constitucional 
no Brasil está em perfeita sintonia com o mesmo fenôme-
no no cenário internacional – e tem uma relação direta 
com muitas características do Texto Fundamental. Ana-
lítica (mais de 400 artigos), e com um largo espectro de 
direitos fundamentais, a Carta Constitucional brasileira 
provê um ambiente que favorece intensa controvérsia 
acerca das obrigações do Estado na oferta de bens e ser-
viços públicos, ou mesmo acerca das possíveis tensões 
que podem surgir entre esses mesmos direitos. A Supre-
ma Corte brasileira enfrenta um número inadministrável 
de feitos, muitos deles relacionados ao reclamo de não 
garantia de direitos socio-economicos. Este cenário con-
duziu a Suprema Corte brasileira a um experimentalismo 
na construção de suas próprias decisões, aplicando téc-
nicas que podem ser facilmente associadas com muitas 
das manifestações das chamadas teorias dialógicas. To-
das estas experiências revelam que assegurar direitos 
socioeconômicos como um objetivo de concretização 
de justiça exige uma estratégia dialógica no exercício da 
jurisdição constitucional, de maneira a assegurar imple-
mentação graduação, prevenindo a desigualdade. Não 
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Abstract
The exponential growth in judicial review in Brazil, compa-
red with the international scenery, is not out of tune – and 
it has a direct relation with many Brazilian constitutional 
features. An analytical text (with over 400 articles) and 
a large spectrum of fundamental rights, provide an am-
bience that favors highly intense controversy about State 
obligations in providing goods and public services, or even 
about the possible tensions that may arise between those 
same rights. The Brazilian Supreme Court faces that unma-
nageable number of lawsuits, notably related with claims 
regarding the non-granting of socioeconomic rights. That 
scenery is leading the Brazilian Supreme Court to some 
kind of experimentalism in the designing of its own rulin-
gs, applying techniques that can be easily associated with 
many manifestations of the so-called dialogical constitutio-
nalism. All those experiences reveal that granting socioeco-
nomic rights as a distributive justice goal requires a dialogic 
strategy in judicial review, in order to provide progressive 
implementation, preventing inequality. Still, those dialogic 
provisions face serious obstacles related with the menace 
of a merely symbolic use by the Judiciary and with a path 
of substitutive deliberation again by the Judiciary leading 
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PART I – INTRODUCTION
The introduction of dialogical features in judicial review is a strategy that have 
been pointed as useful in order to overcome the never ending debate about legitimacy 
of the judicial control of parliament’s decision. From the known experiences in Cana-
da1 and in the countries that integrated the former Commonwealth, going through 
traditional systems in which judicial supremacy is presented as pillar like in the United 
States2; adding dialogue to an authoritative decision that fix boundaries to constitu-
tional understanding seems to be, at least in theory, a good idea. Even though the real 
potential of the existing normative tools applied in various constitutional systems is 
1  Presenting and debating the efficacy of the Canadian model, see HOGG, Peter W., BUSHELL, Allison A. Charter 
Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures, The (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing after All). 
The Osgoode Hall Law Journal, v. 35, n. 1, Canadá, s.n., p. 75-124, 1997; MANFREDI, Christopher P., KELLY, James 
B.. Six degrees of dialogue: A response to Hogg and Bushell. The Osgoode Hall Law Journal, v. 37, n. 3, Canadá, 
s.n., p. 513-527, 1999; HOGG, Peter W., THORNTON, Allison A.. Reply to Six Degrees of Dialogue. The Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal, v. 37, n. 3, Canadá, s.n., p. 529-536, 1999. The same authors revisited the original presentation 
of the dialogical model in: HOGG, Peter M.; THORNTON, Allison A.; Bushell; WRIGHT, Wade K.. Charter Dialogue 
Revisited-or Much Ado about Metaphors. The Osgoode Hall Law Journal, v. 45, n. 1, Canadá, s.n., p. 1-65, 2007. 
2  BATEUP, Christine. Expanding the conversation: American and Canadian experiences of constitutional dia-
logue in comparative perspective. New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, S.l.: 
s.n. p. 2-66, 2007.
obstante isso, essas providências dialógicas enfrentam 
sérios obstáculos relacionados à ameaça de um uso 
meramente simbólico pelo Judiciário, e ainda com uma 
trajetória de deliberação substitutiva, uma vez mais pelo 
Judiciário, levando a um reforço da inércia legislativa, ou 
à alienação da sociedade em relação ao tema debatido, 
minando a responsavidade democrática. A adoção de 
um modelo de constitucionalismo dialógico no Brasil 
pode ser uma solução adequada para permitir que o sis-
tema alcance o desenvolvimento funcional dos objetivos 
constitucionais – mas ainda requer uma reflexão teórica 
mais profunda. 
Palavras-chave: jurisdição constitucional – diálogo 
constitucional – enforcement de direitos humanos – equi-
líbrio e harmonia entre poderes.
to reinforce Legislative inertia, social alienation from the 
debate and undermining democratic accountability. Adop-
ting a dialogical constitutionalism model in Brazil might be 
a proper solution to allow its system to reach the functional 
development of the constitution’s goals – but it requires a 
deeper theoretical reflection.
Keywords: judicial review – constitutional dialogue – hu-
man rights enforcement – checks and balances.
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still debatable,3 the openness in judicial review to contributions coming from other 
role-players is something to be praised.
The Brazilian judicial review system is an extensive one, with many remedies 
through which the Judiciary can be called to scrutinize the constitutionality of a norma-
tive provision, of an administrative rule or of a public policy4. Add to those an extensive 
constitutional text, with more than 400 articles, and a broad list of fundamental rights 
provided with immediate efficacy, and the result will be an intensive judicialization of 
the conflicts involving granting all of these duties of the State5.
Even though any judge, in any level of the Judiciary, can exercise judicial review 
in the Brazilian system6, the final decision regarding constitutional meaning relies in 
the Supreme Court7 which is prompted to establish the content of a broad variety of 
fundamental rights – including socioeconomic ones. Another challenging task that the 
Brazilian constitution proposes to the Supreme Court, is overcoming legislative inertia, 
through at least two different constitutional guarantees8. 
3  Questioning the viability of a real dialogue, provoked by an authoritative invitation, see: TREMBLAY, Luc B. The 
legitimacy of judicial review: The limits of dialogue between courts and legislatures. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, v. 3, n. 4, S.l., Oxford University Press and New York University School of Law, p. 617-648, 
2005. BATEUP, Christine. The Dialogic Promise-Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional 
Dialogue. Brookling Law Review, v. 71, S. l., New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, 
p. 5-24, 2006. Providing a particular approach of the dialogical theory applied to Latin American countries, see: 
GARGARELLA, Roberto. We the People’Outside of the Constitution: The Dialogic Model of Constitutionalism and 
the System of Checks and Balances. Current Legal Problems, v. 67, n. 1, S.l., Oxford University Press, p. 1-47, 2014.
4  The assertion that public policy is subject to ordinary judicial scrutiny is also a characteristics of the Brazilian 
understanding of the limits to judicial review brought by the separation of power clause. Briefly, the Supreme 
Court has established that public policy might be judicially controlled every time public programs related 
with the implementation of enforcement of fundamental rights do not exist, or are not capable of generating 
proper protection. (VALLE, Vanice Lírio do. “Judicialization of Socioeconomic Rights in Brazil: Mercantilization 
of the Fundamental Rights as a Deviance in Rights Protection.” In 3rd YCC Conference-American Society of 
Comparative law, at the Lewis & Clark University, Portland, Oregon, in April. 2014). 
5  VALLE, Vanice Lírio do. Judicialization of Socio-Economic Rights in Brazil: The Subversion of an Egalitarian 
Discourse. Available at SSRN 2031719 (2012).
6  The constitutionality scrutiny made by ordinary judges throughout the Judiciary branch appears as a logical 
premise to examine the claimed rights violation in the specific presented cases, and  therefore are generally 
not binding. That particular effect is reserved to decisions held by the Supreme Court in the abstract judicial 
review.
7  In the Brazilian judicial system, the constitutional court is called Federal Supreme Court, hereinafter called, 
indistinctively also as Supreme Court or Constitutional Court.
8  The Brazilian constitution provides judicial scrutiny of legislative inertia through an objective action dedi-
cated to declare a constitutional violation originated from the Legislative’s negligence in regulating a specific 
right: Article 103, Paragraph 2. “When unconstitutionality is declared on account of lack of a measure to render a 
constitutional provision effective, the competent Power shall be notified for the adoption of the necessary actions 
and, in the case of an administrative body, to do so within thirty days”. Besides that provision, there is also a con-
stitutional writ – called writ of injunction – oriented to overcome a lack of regulation that is compromising the 
exercise of a fundamental right. If this is the case, one can file a writ of injunction and obtain, from the Supreme 
Court, a decision in which criteria will be established, in order to stop the constitutional violation and enable 
the exercise of the claimed right. That constitutional writ is in the Chapter that enlists fundamental rights and 
guarantees: Article 5, LXXI – “a writ of injunction shall be granted whenever the absence of a regulatory provision 
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The Brazilian constitutional court is frequently called upon to decide in matters 
that go far beyond the exclusive frontiers of the existing law; sometimes examining 
public policies and its ability for fulfil constitutional commitments. When it comes to 
overcoming the absence of a prescribed normative determination, if it relates with a 
political evaluation previously made by the Legislative concerning the burden of iner-
tia, offering the right ruling is also a task that transcends the limits of the domain of 
pure Constitutional Law9. 
 This context led the Brazilian Supreme Court to performing some experiments 
in its rulings, incorporating practices aligned with the dialogical ideal, a dialogue that at 
times might be held with the political branches or even with the society. Expanding the 
conversation – to use Bateup’s expression10 – is a strategy that is being incorporated 
in the Brazilian Supreme Court, in an attempt to increase the legitimacy and juridical 
correctness of rulings in sensible matters. 
Despite the significance of the effort, one should point that due to its lack of 
theoretical deepening and normative discipline, the dialogical exercise is happening in 
a very willful basis – which does not contribute effectively to perfecting judicial review 
as a system. Opting for the application of some of the dialogical tools (public hearings, 
conciliation meetings, readdressing the Legislative with orientation) is mainly an indi-
vidual decision of the Justice-Rapporteur11, in a non-appealable decision, which leads 
to a lack of consistency in the dialogical approach. Anyway, understanding those initia-
tives as a true experiment requires a proper analysis, helping to mature the proposition 
and to incorporate, even in the normative frame, the dialogical tools.
The aim of this paper is to present recent indications of dialogical constitutiona-
lism adopted mainly by the Brazilian Supreme Court. These rulings will provide grounds 
to a draft list of unsettled aspects related with the establishment of a dialogical pattern 
by the Brazilian constitutional court, and should help a proper regulation of the possib-
le dialogical features in judicial review, when time comes to regulate it formally. 
disables the exercise of constitutional rights and liberties, as well as the prerogatives inherent to nationality, sover-
eignty and citizenship.”
9  The extreme example of legislative absence due to a negative evaluation of the results in legislating concerns 
the right to strike, extended also to public servants (and not only to private employees) by the Brazilian con-
stitution in 1988. Opposing to corporative interests of public servants, and delimitating what public activities 
were to be classified as essential – and would, therefore, have limited strike regulations – was found a sensible 
matter by the parliament, and the law to regulate that right was never voted. Various unions filed many writs 
of injunction, until the Supreme Court declared that the Legislative’s behavior was an unconstitutional inertia. 
The leading cases in the matter were the writs of injunction ns. 670 and 708; both decided in 2007. The criteria 
presented by the Court to overcome the absence of regulation was to apply, even when it came to public ser-
vants, a previous law that disciplines strike among private employees.
10  See footnote 2.
11  In the Brazilian courts (all of them, including the Constitutional Court) there is always a Justice-Rapporteur, 
chosen by sorting. That Justice has a very prominent role in the preliminary instruction of the case, and his 
opinion will usually guide the other votes, which will concur or diverge, in a seriatim model of decision building. 
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As a first critical approach to the experimentation that is being conducted by 
the Court, the paper has a mainly descriptive method, and does not address the fre-
quently posed question about the ability of those tools to provide a higher degree of 
legitimation to the judicial decision. The main purpose is to understand the empirical 
examples, and stress the questions that they propose concerning their real ability to 
promote dialogue – as a premise to the examination of the legitimizing capacities of 
such a supposedly held dialogue.
This paper is developed in four Parts. After the introduction (Part I), a brief report 
regarding the ambience in which the 1988’s Constitution was drafted, and the path 
that its application has taken over the 27 years since the promulgation will be provided 
in Part II. That historical report is a premise to understanding the state-of-the art in 
the Brazilian judicial review system, and the context in which the dialogical practices 
appeared. Part III contains a brief description of the remarkable initiatives carried out by 
the Brazilian Supreme Court in the realm of promoting dialogue with society, and with 
the Legislative in exercising judicial review. In that report, specificities of the Brazilian 
system that might help understand the described rulings will be explained. In Part IV 
there is a summing of the differentiation that the Court has established concerning 
the engagement with the society or with the Legislative branch for dialogue. It also 
examines the real potential of those initiatives to promote real dialogue among the 
aforementioned parties. 
The differentiation implemented by the Brazilian Supreme Court among the 
dialogical strategies maintained with society or with the Legislative branch is find justi-
fiable, due to the dissimilar relationships that each one will have with the process itself 
of molding the judicial decision. The problem remains in the real aptness of the so-far 
experimented strategies to provide palpable, sufficient and efficient exchange among 
the intended debaters.
Creating a broad system of judicial review from the scratch is a task that the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1988 proposed. It was fully embraced by the Brazilian Judiciary 
and by the Supreme Court in particular. In spite of that, dialectics is an indispensable 
exercise dedicated to subsidizing Justices in that challenging objective. Experimenta-
tion in judicial practices can be a meritorious effort to enhance a ruling’s potential to 
eliminate constitutional violation, especially when it is clear that those decision might 
have not only direct effects, but also indirect results that concur to constitutional im-
plementation readdressing strategic choices in debatable matters to the social or the 
political realm12. Improving the experiments’ results is therefore, a permanent goal.
In conclusion, two main risks in the previous experiments will be highlighted. 
12  RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, César. Beyond the courtroom: The impact of judicial activism on socioeconomic 
rights in Latin America. Texas Law Review, v. 89, n. 7, S.l.:s.n., p. 1669-1699, 2010.
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First, there is the menace of a symbolic evocation of a supposed dialogue as 
a way to enforce the Court’s authority – which is curious, as long as the mainstream 
of critics in dialogical theories usually points the Legislative as the interlocutor who 
is not willing to engage in conversation. Symbolical use of dialogue appears to be 
happening in the public hearings, in order to provide a perceived level of legal cor-
rectness in the ruling, which deviates the Court from its real duty in providing proper 
foundation for the decision. Disregarding the contributions that might come from an 
effective exchange of ideas in public hearings without the required rebuttal in the 
ruling’s base is denying the belief that constitutional interpretation and meaning’s 
updating is something that should happen with the help of its own original designers 
– the people themselves.
The second risk brought to light by the experimentalism carried out by the Bra-
zilian Supreme Court relates to solutions in which the Judiciary substitutes the Legisla-
tive branch in its deliberative capacity – even if in an intended provisory solution. That 
alternative somehow abdicates of a constitutional duty signaled to the Court, which 
is granting the proper exercise of the political specialized functions by each branch 
of power. Replacing the Legislative in the absence of a needed regulation might have 
as a primary effect, the granting of rights’ enforcement – but neglects the importance 
of preserving the democratic opportunity to debate, of people taking possession of a 
matter in which dissent is established. 
Still in the democratic perspective, replacing a legislative deliberation by a judi-
cial ruling contributes to cloud responsibilities, as long as to ordinary people; the infor-
mation that lasts is that there is a rights limitation, or some other command. Authorship 
of such decisions is rarely known, and rapidly forgotten, which favors a lack of accoun-
tability and responsiveness. 
Constitutional dialogue is a practice that intends to increase constitutional de-
ference – not Judiciary deference, neither Legislative deference, but constitutional de-
ference. This means that preserving the constitutional engineering when it comes to 
power and public deliberation is as relevant, when exercising judicial review, as rights 
protection. That understanding should inspire further developments in the Brazilian 
experience in dialogical constitutionalism, and might help the incorporation of such 
practices in other countries.
PART II – THE BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1988: A 
TRANSFORMATIVE PROJECT ENFORCED THROUGH JUDICIAL REVIEW
The end of the dictatorship period in Brazil resulted from a long and deeply ne-
gotiated process that was carried out, since the beginning, without a primary concern for 
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the approval of a new constitution13. The former Constitution of 1967, amended in 1969, 
was marked by deep centralization of power14, but it also provided a reasonable insti-
tutional arrangement, and even a long list of fundamental rights – granted, these were 
considered little more than a rhetorical assertion at the highest point of the dictatorship, 
but they were still there. In the late 80’s, with the political negotiation advancing, rede-
mocratization seemed to be achievable without the immediate need for a brand new 
constitution. At that point, Brazil was experiencing its own “transition through transac-
tion” 15, and opening a discussion regarding a new constitution seemed to be not only 
unnecessary, but also inconvenient. It should be understood that the Brazilian political 
transition was primarily conducted by the military – who were no longer able to maintain 
the authoritarian regime which was in place since 1964 – and by political elites.
The unexpected happening that modified that perception that a new constitu-
tion was not required, was the death of Tancredo Neves – elected for presidency in 1985 
as the opposition candidate, with a wide support of the progressive political forces. His 
Vice-President, on the other hand, was José Sarney, identified with the conservative 
wing, admitted as a candidate to Vice-Presidency as trade-off through coalition buil-
ding during the transition process. Tancredo fell gravely ill on the eve of his inaugura-
tion, March 14th, 1985; and due to surgery complications, died 39 days later. This is how 
Brazilian politicians, who expected to complete the political transition with a President 
highly supported by the political class and by the population, ended with an undesired 
Chief of the Executive branch. At that point, the delicate balance among the political 
forces engaged in the redemocratization process was compromised – this is when the 
idea of a new Constitution turns up as a way to consolidate the transitional process. 
The Constitutional Assembly was summoned through a constitutional amend-
ment sent to the national Congress by President Sarney in July 1985, in the very early 
days of his term. The amendment granted constitutional powers to the National Con-
gress, which was to be elected in 1986, a mild solution that brought a lot of criticism 
because it would lead to an accumulation of the ordinary legislative functions, with the 
more prominent task of carving the new Fundamental Law. 
Regardless of the initial difficulties, the Constituent Assembly took place, and 
the deliberation happened in an ambience of delicate balance between conservative 
and progressive forces. Brazilian political literature usually indicates that the inclusion 
13  MAINWARING, Scott. The transition to democracy in Brazil. Journal of Inter-American Studies and World 
Affairs, v. 28, n. 1, S.l.:s.n., p. 149-179, 1986.
14  Despite adopting the federalist model, the dictatorship period was marked by the centralization of power: 
indirect elections were held for state governors, while the President appointed mayors of state capitals. Cen-
tralization was also the moto in the fiscal sphere, with a tax power distribution that highly favors the federal 
government. (SELCHER, Wayne A. A new start toward a more decentralized federalism in Brazil? Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism, v. 19, n. 3, S.l.:s.n., p. 167-183, 1989.)
15  SHARE, Donald. Transitions to democracy and transition through transaction. Comparative Political Stud-
ie, v. 19, n. 4, S.l., Sage Publications, p. 525-548, 1987.
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of a broad list of fundamental rights – many related with liberty, but also socioecono-
mic ones – was the strategic path adopted by the progressive forces in the Constituent 
Assembly, to establish priorities in the political agenda settled by social inclusiveness. 
That course of action was completed with an institutional design that contemplates a 
variety of agents that might control the adherence, by the political process, to those 
constitutional values and priorities. 
The first institution to be mentioned is the Public Prosecution, in charge of de-
fending citizens’ and society’s constitutional interests, and to ensure that the public 
administration complies with its constitutional responsibilities16. A second institution, 
also relevant is that of the Public Defender, in charge of providing legal assistance to 
the ones in need. The Public Defender, in fact, is the institutional realization of another 
constitutional provision, which guarantees the access to justice as a fundamental right. 
Considering that access to justice, at least in the formal sense of filing a lawsuit is so-
mething that requires a lawyer, those who cannot afford one are provided for with the 
Public Defender. Both institutions operate with public servants selected through public 
competition, with tenure and other career guarantees. The general idea is that if, for any 
reason, the political process of enforcing social rights is obstructed, those institutions 
will have the means and independence to fight for those rights.
In 1988, the Constitution was promulgated, and given the name “the Citizen 
Constitution”, since it prioritized the country’s citizens and the national goal of social 
inclusion – social inequality, at the time, was at its peak17. Even though there have been 
85 amendments to the Brazilian constitution approved over its 27 years of existence, 
the central distribution of power, and the main commitment with social transformation 
is still at its core – actually, it is reinforced by new clauses concerning public funding for 
the provision of the socioeconomic rights listed by the Constitution. 
As the years went by and the representative dimension of the democratic principle 
was somewhat consolidated, those social commitments translated in fundamental rights 
granted by the Constitution came to the front line of the political agenda. The 1988’s tran-
sitional project represented by the “Citizen-Constitution” needed enforcement, and this 
16  The Brazilian constitution, Article 127 – The Public Prosecution is a permanent institution, essential to the 
jurisdictional function of the State, and it is its duty to defend the juridical order, the democratic regime and 
inalienable social and individual interests. For a broader description of the Public Prosecution role in the Bra-
zilian system, see: SADEK, Maria Tereza; CAVALCANTI, Rosângela Batista. The new Brazilian public prosecution: 
an agent of accountability.In: MAINWARING, Scott; WELNA, Christofer. Democratic Accountability in Latin 
America. S.l.: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003. p. 201-227.
17  In fact, between the late 1970s and early 1990 the country has the highest percentage of the population 
classified as indigent: approximately 20% between 1978 and 1993, being the peak-years 1983 (20,5%), 1984 
(23,6) and the years after the constituent process, 1988 (22,1), 1989 (20,7), 1990 (21,3). (Costa, Lucas NF. “The 
lobby in the Brazillian constituent process of 1987-88.”, quoting Noronha, E. G., Mudança Constitucional e a 
Constituinte de 1987-88: temas e preferências de empresários e sindicalistas: um ensaio preliminar sobre a 
Constituinte e a transição. Paper apresentado no 7º Encontro da ABCP - Associação Brasileira de Ciência Políti-
ca. Recife, 04 a 07 de agosto de 2010).
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was not happening through the ordinary political process. In spite of the good intentions 
manifested during the Constituent Assembly, the political framework still concentrated 
power in the Executive branch18, and did not empower the Legislative – therefore, power 
was still unshared, isolated and almost immune to popular pressure. In the mid-90’s, most 
of the constitutional promises in the social realm were still no more than wishful thinking. 
At this moment, directing the social claims in fundamental rights to the Judiciary seemed 
to be the only alternative, and this is when the judicialization started.
In fact, in the mid-90’s, the two conditions pointed by Kapiszewski19 as neces-
sary to impel to the Judiciary conflicts related with public policies in the social realm 
were present in the Brazilian scenario. Government action in many fields distanced 
itself from the constitutional commitments and potential litigants were enabled to 
file a lawsuit to challenge such diversion. That conflict between a perception of the 
constitutional commitments and the government’s path of action was identified in 
many areas – federalism, taxation power and distribution, economic reforms throu-
gh constitutional amendments, and in social rights. The impasse made the use of 
the mechanisms created by the constitution itself to activate the judiciary attrac-
tive, especially the Supreme Court. Governors, political parties, civil associations, 
unions, the Public Prosecution; all of the ones who held the legal capacity to sue 
were using it, addressing to the Supreme Court abstract review mechanisms. In a 
broader perspective, rights violation in the social inclusion field were also claimed 
throughout the judiciary with the support of the Public Defender. These claims, at a 
certain point, also reached the Supreme Court, through the mechanisms to appeal 
in the concrete review cases.  
On the other hand, in the 1990’s decade the Brazilian Supreme Court was re-
newed, with the retirement of most of the Justices that were appointed to the ben-
ch before the Constitution of 1988. This new composition of the Court is particularly 
relevant to understand the ascending curve of judicialization in Brazil. Justices in the 
former composition of the Court were men with a stronger identification with private 
law20 – a feature that led the Supreme Court, in the early days, to a self-restraint behavior 
when it came to the innovations proposed by the 1988’s constitution. Among those 
18  That preeminent role of the Executive branch is pointed as a common feature among the Latin American 
constitutions from a long time (GARGARELLA, Roberto; COURTIS, Christian Courtis. El nuevo constitucionalis-
mo latinoamericano: promesas e interrogantes. S.l.: CEPAL, 2009). 
19  KAPISZEWSKI, Diana. Power Broker, Policy Maker, or Rights Protector?. In: HELMKE, Gretchen; RIOS-FIGUEROA, 
Julio. Courts in Latin America. S.l.: Cambrigde University, 2011. p. 154-186.
20  The constituent assembly opted to maintain the Justices that were previously nominated to the Supreme 
Court, who were never involved in any kind of condemnable endorsement of the dictatorship decisions or 
behavior. Despite that, it is understandable that after almost 30 years of dictatorship, the Court was not filled 
with scholars and lawyers with a strong background and experience in public law litigation. This is why the 
Brazilian Supreme Court in 1988 was composed of a significant sample of important jurists – but with former 
experience in private and procedural law.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 1, n. 3, p. 59-90, set./dez. 2014.
Vanice Regina Lírio do Valle
68 
novelties was the judicial review system itself, which combined an extended legal ca-
pacity to sue, with a broad range of mechanisms through which one law or normative 
provision could be challenged as unconstitutional. 
The first approach by the Brazilian Supreme Court to that expanded judicial 
review system was conservative and restrained; procedural issues were frequently 
appointed as a blockage factor, and separation of powers was a canon that imposed 
serious limitations to judicial interference in the realm of public policies and the gran-
ting of fundamental rights. Despite the Court’s cautiousness, the crisis in public action 
related to the constitutional commitments in social rights was directing those conflicts 
to the Supreme Court21 – therefore, the challenge had to be faced.
In the late 90’s, with a brand new composition of Justices nominated by Pre-
sidents elected under the 1988’s constitution, the Supreme Court started to examine 
a large spectrum of fundamental rights brought to its attention through all sorts of 
litigation. The definitive turning point in the defensive pattern is in a ruling in 200522, 
in which the Constitutional Court examined a lawsuit filed by the Public Prosecution 
against Santo André City Hall, sustaining that the right to access to pre-school was 
being violated, because the municipal government was not providing placement in 
institutions of that nature. In that leading case, the Court asserted the following: “…
Although the prerogative of formulating and executing public policies relies primarily in the 
Legislative and Executive branches, it is possible for the Judiciary to determinate, even if in 
exceptional basis, the implementation by state agencies of those same policies, especially 
if they are defined by the Constitution. The State’s omission in those cases may compromise 
the efficacy and integrity of social and cultural rights of constitutional status – as long as it 
reveals a breach of their political-juridical mandatory duties.”
That proclamation encompasses not only the competence of the Supreme 
Court to scrutinize public policies in order to test their accordance with the constitutio-
nal order; but it reclaims the competence also to substitute other political institutions 
in determining the implementation of a non-existent or a perfected public policy. 
PART III – THE SUPREME COURT AS A POLICY EXAMINER 
AND THE NEED TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGICAL STRATEGIES
Although the proclamation of its own role in the enforcement of the social eco-
nomic rights, and therefore, of the commitments enounce by the Brazilian constitution 
21  The Brazilian system – unlike many others around the world – does not formally grant the Supreme Court 
the possibility of choosing which writs or lawsuits in general would be heard. If the formal requirements are 
observed, the Supreme Court must rule – and this is why a Justice in that same Court in Brazil will decide an 
average of 10.000 to 12.000 cases a year.
22  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. RE 410715 AgR, Justice-Rapporteur:  CELSO DE MELLO, Second Panel, ruled 
in 22/11/2005, DJ 03-02-2006 PP-00076 EMENT VOL-02219-08 PP-01529 RTJ VOL-00199-03 PP-01219 RIP v. 7, n. 
35, 2006, p. 291-300 RMP n. 32, 2009, p. 279-290.
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seemed a good (or at least, an inevitable) assertion; the result was a sort of rebound 
effect, readdressing those conflicts directly to the Supreme Court. Litigation increases, 
in a quantitative and a qualitative basis. 
Over the past 10 years, the Court has been called upon to solve problems that 
range from the public servants’ right to go on strike23, to gay marriage24; from granting 
women access to infertility treatment through the public health system25 to the judi-
ciary’s competence to command public works in order to guarantee adequate prison 
quarters and conditions26. Name it – and it will probably have been in the Court’s docket. 
The Supreme Court examined the ban of the practice of cleaning land through burning 
as an agricultural practice27, and also the constitutionality of affirmative action in uni-
versity access28. 
Many of these subjects (if not all of them) enclose many non-juridical pre-
mises. Many of those subjects propose a priority definition in public policy agenda. 
Many of those subjects rouse debates over morality, scientific information and belie-
fs. Many of those subjects have significant economic repercussion, if the decision is in 
favor of ordering some kind of public action. Those possibilities recall the well known 
debate concerning the legitimacy in judicial review, and the argument regarding the 
absence of expertise of the judges in facing the reasoning in scientific field, which go 
far beyond law and rights. In that frame of uncertainty, the Brazilian Supreme Court 
started engaging in the previously mentioned experimentalism, in which dialogical 
practices were incorporated, as a means to increase legitimacy in a prospective ruling.
Dialogical engagement is not a feature formally contemplated in the Brazilian 
system of judicial review – at least, none of the dialogical features reported from the 
mentioned experiences in Canada, England, New Zealand and Israel. The constitu-
tional text refers to the Supreme Court as “…responsible, essentially, for safeguarding 
the Constitution…”29 , and that expression has been interpreted as proclaiming judi-
cial supremacy, and therefore, the Court’s capacity to, by itself, decide constitutional 
23  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. MI 708, Justice-Rapporteur:  GILMAR MENDES, Full Court, ruled in 
25/10/2007, DJe-206 DIVULG 30-10-2008 PUBLIC 31-10-2008 EMENT VOL-02339-02 PP-00207 RTJ VOL-00207-
02 PP-00471.
24  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADPF 132, Justice-Rapporteur:  CARLOS BRITTO, Full Court, ruled in 
05/05/2011, DJe-198 DIVULG 13-10-2011 PUBLIC 14-10-2011 EMENT VOL-02607-01 PP-00001.
25  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. SS 3263, Justice-Rapporteur: Chief-Justice ELLEN GRACIE, ruled in 
23/07/2007, publicado em DJ 02/08/2007 PP-00074.
26  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. RE 592581 RG, Justice-Rapporteur: RICARDO LEWANDOWSKI, ruled in 
22/10/2009, DJe-218 DIVULG 19-11-2009 PUBLIC 20-11-2009 EMENT VOL-02383-06 PP-01173 RDDP n. 84, 
2010, p. 125-128.
27  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. RE 586224 RG, Justice-Rapporteur: EROS GRAU, ruled in 11/12/2008, DJe-
025 DIVULG 05-02-2009 PUBLIC 06-02-2009 EMENT VOL-02347-13 PP-02567.
28  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADPF 186, Justice-Rapporteur:  RICARDO LEWANDOWSKI, Full Court, ruled 
in 26/04/2012, ACÓRDÃO ELETRÔNICO DJe-205 DIVULG 17-10-2014 PUBLIC 20-10-2014.
29  The Brazilian Constitution, article 102.
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matters, protecting the Constitution. That understanding of the constitutional clause, 
if contextualized, can be taken as a necessary proclamation of the auto-sufficiency of 
the Court to fulfill its own constitutional aim. In the early days, when institutional nor-
mality was still a work in progress, to assert the Supreme Court’s auto-sufficiency was 
to affirm its independency – which was a relevant feature in the newly established 
democratic order. 
In the mid to late 1990’s, the fear of an institutional attack against the Brazilian 
Supreme Court was no longer present, so an openness to some form of dialogue – 
apart from the conversation between the Justices themselves – was no more seen as 
a threat. Besides that, in sensible matters marked by profound disagreement, opening 
the debate to more speakers was a wise decision. 
In 1999, Congress approved Law 9868, which regulates procedure in the abs-
tract mechanisms of constitutionality scrutiny30, and that statute was the first opening 
towards a more proactive interaction with the Court, referring to the amicus curiae and 
to public hearings31. The vague terms of the precept prevented its application for a long 
time, since there were no guidelines about how those public hearings might happen. 
A)  Establishing dialogue through public hearings
The first dialogue-oriented initiative by the Brazilian Supreme Court was the 
calling of a public hearing in the abstract constitutionality scrutiny of Law 11.105/05 
32 – a statute that regulated scientific research with the employment of stem-cells. The 
public hearing was summoned in March 16th, 2007 by the Judge-Rapporteur (Carlos 
Britto, now retired), even though the above mentioned legal clause concerning public 
hearings was not regulated. At the time, Justice Carlos Britto had already admitted ami-
ci curiae representing various interests – researchers, patients of illnesses that might 
profit from research with stem-cells, church members, and government officials. Regar-
dless of this, Justice Carlos Britto was searching for legitimacy on grounds not only of 
scientific knowledge, but also of social perception on the matter, and summoning the 
public hearing was the chosen alternative to do so33. 
30  One of the original proponents of such a law was Justice Gilmar Mendes – at the time, not yet in the Court. 
Judicial review was the main subject of Gilmar Mendes’ academic research in Germany, and he was a well-
known author in the field, way before his nomination to the Court in 2002. 
31  Law 9869/99, Article 9, Paragraph 1 –  “In case of a need of clarification about the matter or factual circum-
stance, or notorious lack of information in the court records, the Judge-Rapporteur may require additional informa-
tion, nominate an expert or an expert commission to emit an opinion about the subject; or even designate a date to, 
in a public hearing, hear testimonies from people invested with experience and authority in the matter…”
32  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADI 3510, Justice-Rapporteur:  CARLOS BRITTO, Full Court, ruled in 
29/05/2008, DJe-096 DIVULG 27-05-2010 PUBLIC 28-05-2010 EMENT VOL-02403-01 PP-00134 RTJ VOL-00214- 
PP-00043.
33  Justice Carlos Britto formally asserted that intention, in a preliminary decision in which he clarifies his aim: 
“…the public hearing, besides subsidizing the Justice of the Supreme Court, also will allow a bigger participation of 
civil society in facing the controversy, legitimizing the ruling to be adopt by the Full Panel of that Court.”
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The leading case adopted the procedure prescribed in the Deputy’s Chamber 
Regiment by decision of Justice Carlos Britto – overcoming the lack of regulation in the 
Supreme Court. Despite that, important features of the public hearing were drawn whi-
le it took place – and some of them, it should be stressed, were not entirely compatible 
with the intended engagement in a dialogical practice.
The first paradox proposed by that precedent, was that participants in the public 
hearing were not authorized to engage in conversation amongst each other. Refuting 
or concurring with an argument brought by an invitee was not allowed; and the same 
veto was thrown at the presentation of legal arguments. The second paradox resides 
in the fact that contributions brought to the public hearing were not systematized or 
incorporated in the ruling reasoning.  
After that leading case, a second development in the mechanism proposed by 
the Court was the possibility to implement that kind of dialogue without reference to a 
specific lawsuit. That experiment was performed in 2009, by Justice Gilmar Mendes (at 
the time, Chief-Justice34), and was justified by the need to provide technical information 
to be applied in the many lawsuits in which the rights to health was at stake35 – some 
of them, subject to a primary decision by the Chief-Justice36.  The summoning of that 
specific hearing contained a list of inquiries for which Justice Gilmar Mendes intended 
to find clarification – an interesting mechanism that can orient even which kind of in-
tervention is really intend by the Court.
In the same year, the Court finally enacted Amendment nº 29 to its own Inter-
nal Regiment, and regulated the public hearings, fixing some general principles, such 
as the broad publicity of its summons, the mandatory registry of the hearing, gran-
ting of equal participation of the diverse tendencies and opinions. A pillar in that re-
gulation was also leaving exclusively to the Judge-Rapporteur decisions concerning 
the summons of the hearing, which players to invite, who to select after candidacy 
and how the hearing will progress. These decisions are not only exclusively trusted 
to the Judge-Rapporteur, but they are also discretionary – and not submitted to any 
kind of appeal. 
34  In the Brazilian system, the Chief-Justice is not a permanent position; a Justice is elected for a two-year term, 
and by the end of that period, remains in the Court as Justice until retirement – which is compulsory at the 
age of 70.
35   “In 2009, 5,536 cases appealing high court rulings related to the right to health reached the Superior Court of 
Justice, and about half of these cases (n=2,583) were for access to medicines. In the same year, the Federal Supreme 
Court heard 806 cases related to the right to health, 142 of which were for access to medicines.” Biehl, João, et al. 
Between the court and the clinic: Lawsuits for medicines and the right to health in Brazil. Health Human Rights 
14 (2012): 36-52.
36  In the Brazilian system, the Chief Justice in any tribunal can grant provisional measures, in order to pre-
vent the perishing of a right, or serious injury to public order or public finances. Asking for a provisional 
ruling is very common in lawsuits in which a health right is claim in the diffuse constitutional control.
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Curiously, the Regiment Amendment did not address salient points like the 
possibility of establishment of some kind of dialectics beyond the participants of a 
public hearing, and the query list as a required guideline for the contributions. The 
main inspiration is to grant a level of discretionary choice to the Justice-Rapporteur, 
to decide about the better way to favor dialogue, taking into account the focal point 
in the discussion. 
From that point, the public hearings continue to happen, in the most variable 
shapes and forms. Until October, 2014, one can count a total of 16 public hearings, in an 
8 years period, which is not a modest number – an average of 2 per year. 
Table 1
B)  Establishing dialogue with the Legislative 
branch through the writ of injunction
A second attempt to engage in dialogical practices was developed in the Court’s 
relationship with the Legislative – mostly, in cases in which the conflict derives from 
a lack of regulation. The Brazilian Constitution, analytical and generous in the social 
realm, many times states clearly that a law is to be enacted in order to make a constitu-
tional right that was not entirely defined in its content or addressees effective 37 – and 
in those cases, identifying an unconstitutional lack of legislative deliberation is not that 
37  The Brazilian constitution, built in a transition achieved by transaction, has many commands in which, using 
Sunstein’s expression, you can find constitutional agreement without constitutional theory (SUNSTEIN, Cass 
R. Constitutional agreements without constitutional theories. Ratio Juris, v. 13, n. 1, S.l:s.n, p. 117-130, 2000). 
That strategy opened space for legislative development – but in many cases, that development simply did not 
happen due to political cost in deciding sensible matter. 
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hard. In other situations, although that same commandment issued by the constituent 
power to the Legislative is not express, there is no doubt that the constitutional clause 
should be developed by infraconstitutional law, due to the vagueness of its own ter-
ms. Finally, there is a third possible situation, in which a progressive interpretation of a 
constitutional clause results in the demand for further legislative development. 
All those possibilities required a lot of activity from the Legislative after the Cons-
titution’s promulgation; and building consensus around those “law-dependent” constitu-
tional clauses was almost impossible due to a divided Congress38. Legislative inertia beca-
me a threat to constitutional efficacy, which triggered the activation of the political con-
trol mechanisms, including judicial review of an unconstitutional omission by parliament.
In the Brazilian system of judicial review, legislative omission can be control-
led through an abstract action (direct action of unconstitutionality by omission) and 
through diffuse control, in the writ of injunction or even in the extraordinary appeal39. 
All of these instruments allow the Court to scrutinize the  constitutionality of a lack of 
deliberation by the Legislative – but the writ of injunction in particular, combine to that 
investigation, a claim to granting a constitutional right, impaired in its exercise due to 
the absence of the proper legislative regulation. 
1) First “communication” in constitutional dialogue: the (in)existence itself of a 
legislative duty in enacting a law
In the early times, the Supreme Court recognized its competence to declare 
that legislative deliberation was required in some situations, even in the absence of a 
“by-law” express clause – in fact, that possibility derives directly from article 103 Para-
graph 2 of the Brazilian Constitution40. This can be indicated as a first “message” in the 
constitutional dialogue, since the legislative provision might have not been perceive 
as necessary or constitutionally mandatory. Excluded the most evident hypothesis in 
which the constitution itself requires the legislative development of a clause, there 
are many occasions in when the parliamentary intervention derives from the vague-
ness of a word or expression used by constitution – and this is not a crystal clear area. 
Besides that difficulty in recognizing an originary duty to deliberate, a legislative 
omission can also be perceived in the moment of the application of a norm, which mi-
ght demonstrate failure in prognosis or foresight, and a possible harm to fundamental 
rights. In that case, the missing act of regulation is the one that will correct the original 
38  DIXON, Rosalind;GINSBURG, Tom. Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design (2011). Inter-
national Journal of Constitutional Law, v. 9, n.. 389, Chicago, Law Working Paper, p. 636-672, 2011. p. 666. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2085011
39  See footnote nº 6.
40  See footnote nº 6.
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law.  All these examples of “blind spots”41 might occur with the most democratic, res-
ponsive and committed Legislative – and regardless of that, require correction through 
a new deliberation.
A Court decision in a writ of injunction, therefore, helps to clarify the matters in 
which a legislative intervention is not a matter of political priority or discretional choice 
– but is a constitutional requirement.
A recent ruling enlighten the relevance of a judicial assertion about the (in)exis-
tence of a constitutional assignment to legislate. The Brazilian Association of Gays, Les-
bians and Transgender People filed a writ of injunction in 2013, defending the presence 
of an unlawful legislative inertia in regards to qualifying as crime any form of homopho-
bia, aggression or discrimination motivated by sexual orientation or gender identity of 
the victim42. The plaintiffs founded their lawsuit in constitutional clauses against discri-
mination, expressed in article 5º, XLI and XLII43.  The thesis was that if racism is deemed 
a crime not subject to bail, then homophobia - a discriminatory behavior towards a 
specific social group linked by a perceived characteristic - must be equally rejected and 
qualified as a crime. 
The original decision in that injunction was to deny the existence of a constitu-
tional command to punish that discrimination through criminalization. Discrimination 
can be reproached through other ways – that was the main argument – and creating 
a crime was not a clear constitutional command; therefore, the Legislative might even 
create such a crime, but in the due political time, according to the People’s represen-
tatives. The discussion – it must be said – is not over yet; there is an appeal pending of 
appreciation, in a very clear exercise of strategic litigation.
It is fair to say that the assertion of a constitutional disapproval to the absence 
of a law is itself, at least, a “first phrase” in a possible constitutional dialogue between 
the Supreme Court and the Legislative. The original assumption that even in injunc-
tion cases, the only possible ruling was to reveal the unlawful Legislative omission 
was challenged by the simple circumstance that such communication was not achie-
ving any answer from the Parliament. In many subjects, injunctions were filed and 
decided, the Legislative was urged to enact a proper law, and simply ignored the 
recommendation.  
41  DIXON, Rosalind. Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form versus Weak-Form Judicial 
Review Revisited. International Journal of Constitutional Law, v. 5, n. 3, S.l., Oxford University Press and New 
York University School of Law, p. 391-418, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536716 or http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1536716.
42  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. MI 4733, Justice-Rapporteur: RICARDO LEWANDOWSKI, ruled in 23/10/2013, 
published in ELECTRONIC LAWSUIT DJe-213 DIVULG 25/10/2013 PUBLIC 28/10/2013.
43  Article 5º, XLI – “the law shall punish any discrimination which may attempt against fundamental rights and 
liberties; 
XLII – the practice of racism is a non-bailable crime, with no limitation, subject to the penalty of confinement, under 
the terms of the law;”
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A second step was taken in establishing a disguised dialogue, in rulings in which 
a rights grant claiming was added to the declaration of the legislative inertia, especially 
in writ of injunction. The new understanding of the Court’s competence in such cases is 
presented in its official website44: 
“…The Plenary of the Court has adopted the understanding that, in a prolonged period 
of omission, it is possible that the decision pronounced by the Supreme Federal Court is 
capable of regulating the subject, in a case of omission, during a given period or until the 
regulation is edited to fill the gap. In these cases, the Court, without assuming an exercise 
typical of the Legislative, has accepted the possibility that the Judiciary can temporarily 
regulate the matter.”
That second approach recognizes that a traditional application of the separation 
of powers clause cannot result in allowing the Legislative to disobey the constitutional 
command to decide – and on top of that, oppose itself to any other form of regulation. 
It is a matter of legitimacy: if the Legislative violates a specific - and now made clear by 
the Courts decision - duty to deliberate, it will lose the legitimacy to prevent the Judi-
ciary from regulating the matter.
At first glance, that might appear as an interruption in the dialogue: the Legisla-
tive is not answering, so the Judiciary will end the conversation by establishing its own 
criteria. That understanding, however, does not take into account the fact that dialogue 
between two political power branches is never as direct as it is between teenagers, or 
less enigmatic characters. 
2)  The second “communication” in a constitutional dialogue: a sign of the possi-
ble content of a prospective legislation
The leading case, in which the Brazilian Supreme Court applied this new stan-
dard in ruling the writ of injunction, was one concerning the public servants’ right to 
engage in strike45. The absence of a law regulating the matter was pointed out to the 
Legislative many times, and the inertia remained. Therefore, the Supreme Court, in or-
der to overcome this blockage, decided to apply to such situations the same law that 
disciplines striking among private employees – Law 7783/89. It was an interesting so-
lution, since it was not entirely detached from a previous legislative decision - even 
though it was not intended for the public sector. 
That same strategy was applied, at the same time, in another situation in whi-
ch many injunctions had been previously decided with the communication of the 
44  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. International portal. Judicial review. Available at <http://www2.stf.jus.br/
portalStfInternacional/cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idConteudo=123036>, ac-
cess in October 20, 2014.
45  See footnote nºs. 7 and 18.
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unconstitutionality of the deliberative inertia. The claim concerned a special regime of 
retirement for labor activities that are insalubrious, dangerous or can provide any form 
of harm46. Here too, the Supreme Court decided to extend the application of another 
law that regulates the same situation, only with private employees – Law 8212/91.
In both cases, the continued omission by the Legislative was clearly credited to 
a political evaluation which considered that not deciding would be less harmful than 
opposing corporative interests to fulfill the public servants’ will. When the judicial ruling 
was issue, politicians protested against an “invasion” in their deliberative function, and 
the Supreme Court was labeled “activist”. Despite that rhetorical protest, the original 
ruling in both cases happened in 2009 – and until now, almost 6 years later, the cons-
titutionally required laws have yet to be approved, and the provisional criteria pointed 
by Court is still being applied.
Clearly, in both cases, the Legislative seems to have decided that the criteria 
elected by the Supreme Court was bearable – and accepted the result. The answer is 
subtle, but exists, as long the Court had clearly affirmed that legislative deliberation 
was still possible, and even desirable. Nevertheless, acceptation is not the only possible 
response in this delicate dialogue.
A second effect which can derive from the recognition of the Court’s competen-
ce to fill the regulatory gap is to expedite legislative decision when the signs are that 
this might be a less harmful result. Again, a very representative example can be found 
in another writ of injunction, this time regarding a constitutional provision that grants 
workers a previous notice of dismissal. The literal clause in the Constitution refers to an 
“advanced notice of dismissal in proportion to the period of service, of at least thirty days, 
as provided by law” (article 7, XXI). The law required in the final part of the provision 
was never enacted, and dismissal was preceded by an advance notice of 30 days – the 
minimum signalized by constitution. It should be clarified that such notice can be, by 
employer’s choice, compensated with money, should he decide against maintaining a 
fired employee in the company premises for 30 days. 
For many years, the correct fixation of the compensation parameters was clai-
med through writs of injunction, and the Court initially adopted the conservative posi-
tion that the only possible judicial response was to inform the  Congress that enacting 
the law was beyond a discretionary realm – in fact, it was a constitutional duty47. A law 
proposition was even presented to the Congress – which was never voted, due to the 
46  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. MI 758, Justice-Rapporteur:  MARCO AURÉLIO, Full Court, ruled in 
01/07/2008, DJe-182 DIVULG 25-09-2008 PUBLIC 26-09-2008 EMENT VOL-02334-01 PP-00037 RDECTRAB v. 15, 
n. 174, 2009, p. 157-167.
47  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. MI 695, Justice-Rapporteur:  SEPÚLVEDA PERTENCE, Full Court, ruled in 
01/03/2007, DJ 20-04-2007 PP-00087 EMENT VOL-02272-01 PP-00001 LEXSTF v. 29, n. 341, 2007, p. 90-94 RDEC-
TRAB v. 14, n. 155, 2007, p. 118-133.
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economic implications such deliberation might encompass when it came to business 
owners who were very satisfied with paying only the minimum of 30 days. 
The Court’s new approach when it comes to its own competencies in the writ on 
injunction indicated in item 3.2.1 above led to new lawsuits in which the denunciation 
of the Legislative reluctance was determined, and the claim for a Court regulation was 
again presented. This time the Court was willing to regulate the matter – and it really 
started to do so, with Justices proposing criteria to guarantee the proportionality re-
quired by the constitution between the length of service and the advanced notice of 
dismissal. The voting was interrupted after Justice Gilmar Mendes asked to examine 
the Court’s file – after the delivery of four Justices’ votes48. It should be noted that Justice 
Gilmar Mendes expressly mention in his request that. “…due to the quantity and diversity 
of suggestions offered by my eminent Colleagues, I indicate an adjournment to consolidate 
the presented proposals and to formulate a conciliatory solution on the manner so the pro-
portionality in the previous dismissal notice might be achieved…”49 – in a clear indication 
that some kind of dialogue should take place, even if outside the Court.
At this point, big time business owners simply made their calculus, as they are used 
to doing, comparing the economic results of the criteria anticipated by the four Justices that 
had already voted with the proposed law that was never approved. The mathematics favo-
red the legislative proposal – this would be the less expensive solution for the employers; 
therefore, the political causes that were impeding the vote in Congress disappear, and the 
law was finally enacted (Law 12506/11), overcoming the unconstitutional omission. 
The “conversation” here had a third line of speech. The approval of the required 
law meant overcoming the legislative omission and the establishment of criteria for the 
future situations – but there were still lawsuits pending in the Supreme Court in the 
same matter, lawsuits in which the newly approved Law 12506/11 will not apply due 
to the non-retroactive clause (dismissal was previous to the legislative deliberation). In 
regards to those cases, the Supreme Court reasserted its competence to fix the, at the 
time, non-existing criteria, but showed deference to the legislative decision, applying 
not the enacted law itself, but the same model to the pending cases50. 
48  The Brazilian Supreme Court decides in a seriatim model; the Justice-Rapporteur starts the voting, and after 
that, each Justice is called to vote. Interrupting the voting with a requirement to examine the file is not only 
possible, but usual – and is becoming a very strategic instrument used by Justices to postpone the conclusion 
of a ruling, or to interfere in their colleague’s or the Court’s collegiate opinion.  
49  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. MI 943, Justice-Rapporteur: GILMAR MENDES, Full Court, ruled in 06/02/2013, 
ACÓRDÃO ELETRÔNICO DJe-081 DIVULG 30-04-2013 PUBLIC 02-05-2013.
50  That orientation is expressly mentioned in the case summary: “1. Writ of injunction. 2. Advance notice of dis-
missal in proportion to the length of service. Federal Constitution, article 7, XXI. 3. Absence of an act of regulation. 
4. Case found valid. 5. Adjournment indication to consolidate a conciliatory proposal about the manner through 
proportionally in the previous dismissal notice might be achieve. 6. Ruling resumed.  7. Approval of Law 12.506/2011 
that regulates the right to proportional previous notice of dismissal. 8. Judicial applications of parameters identical 
to the ones in the mentioned legislation. 9. Authorization to the Justices to apply individually that understanding 
to writ of injunction pending cases, as long as they were filed before the approval of the regulation. 10. Writ of 
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Conversation between the two branches of power is a tricky business – and it 
does not happen only through injunction. Even in the abstract control of constitutio-
nality, in which concrete effects of the decision are not so evident, offering a dialogical 
alternative might prove itself a clever solution.
C)   Establishing dialogue with the Legislative branch 
through modulating the effects of a ruling 
Concluding for the unconstitutionality of a law is an outcome that will fre-
quently require answering, considering that the ruling will proclaim the law void. The 
absence created by the judicial decision might bring consequences that invite, all over 
again, the Legislative to step into the situation. That possibility is even stronger in a 
system like the Brazilian, in which there are no temporal limits to the challenge of a law 
based in unconstitutionality. This is where modulating the effects of a ruling presents 
itself as a tool of dialogue between the Judiciary and the Legislative – again, a subtle 
conversation, but still, with powerful communication. 
Modulating the temporal effects of a ruling is an express possibility in the Bra-
zilian judicial review system. It is contemplated in article 27 of Law 9868/99 in the 
following terms: 
Art. 27. When declaring the unconstitutionality of a law or normative act, and taking 
into account legal certainty or exceptional social interest, the Supreme Federal Tribunal 
may, by a majority of two thirds of its members, constrain the effects of such a declara-
tion, or decide that it should only be effective after becoming res judicatam or at any 
other moment that might be established. 
The clause itself, allowing the efficacy of a ruling to happen in a prospective mo-
ment of time allows space for the Legislative to intervene and overcome the void that 
might come to pass when the decision is effective. 
An enlightening example of how that clause might invite to dialogue is the de-
cision concerning the creation of new municipalities in the Brazilian federation. The 
matter is regulated in article 18, Paragraph 4 of the Brazilian constitution51, which was 
amended in 1996 to require a supplementary federal law that will establish a timeframe 
for those political decisions that have implications in the existent federation members. 
Many years passed without the approval of that law, and establishment, merger, fusion 
injunction found valid. (BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. MI 943, Justice-Rapporteur:  GILMAR MENDES, Full 
Court, ruled in 06/02/2013, ACÓRDÃO ELETRÔNICO DJe-081 DIVULG 30-04-2013 PUBLIC 02-05-2013)
51  The Brazilian Constitution – Article 18, Paragraph 4. The establishment, merger, fusion and dismember-
ment of municipalities shall be effected through state law, within the period set forth by supplementary 
federal law, and shall depend on prior consultation, by means of a plebiscite, of the population of the mu-
nicipalities concerned, after the publication of Municipal Feasibility Studies, presented and published as set 
forth by law.
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and dismemberment of municipalities was blocked as a possible political decision. That 
unbearable inertia led to the filing of a direct action of unconstitutionality by omission52 
in which the Court was asked to overcome the absence of the supplementary federal 
law. At the same time, there were also at the docket, at least four Direct Actions of Un-
constitutionality53 in which the Court was asked to pronounce void laws that created 
municipalities in the absence of the required (and not enacted) supplementary federal 
law.
The solution created by the Court was to combine time parameters. In the direct 
action of unconstitutionality by omission, the Court proclaimed the unlawfulness of the 
legislative inertia, and established: 1) that the future law should take into account the 
irregular situations created during the regulatory void54; and 2) a time limit in which the 
supplementary federal law should be enacted55.
In that case, in fact, the Court combined, in dialoguing with the Legislative, a 
signal of content (a solution to the municipalities created wrongfully due to the absen-
ce of the supplementary federal law) and a timeframe. The result of that dialogue – it 
should be said – is still, in some measure, uncertain. The validation of the municipalities 
created in the absence of the supplementary federal law was achieved through the 
approval of the constitutional amendment nº 57, in December 18, 2008. The supple-
mentary federal law, on the other hand, was approved – in fact, two of them – but the 
President vetoed both, meaning that the political blockage remains.
A second experience involving modulating the effects of a ruling is still ongoing, 
and relates with a very delicate matter. In the Brazilian constitutional system, there is 
52  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADI 3682, Justice-Rapporteur:  GILMAR MENDES, Full Court, ruled in 
09/05/2007, DJe-096 DIVULG 05-09-2007 PUBLIC 06-09-2007 DJ 06-09-2007 PP-00037 EMENT VOL-02288-02 
PP-00277 RTJ VOL-00202-02 PP-00583.
53  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADI 2240, Relator(a):  Min. EROS GRAU, Tribunal Pleno, julgado em 
09/05/2007, DJe-072 DIVULG 02-08-2007 PUBLIC 03-08-2007 DJ 03-08-2007 PP-00029 EMENT VOL-02283-02 
PP-00279; BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADI 3316, Relator(a):  Min. EROS GRAU, Tribunal Pleno, julgado em 
09/05/2007, DJe-047 DIVULG 28-06-2007 PUBLIC 29-06-2007 DJ 29-06-2007 PP-00021 EMENT VOL-02282-03 
PP-00538 RCJ v. 21, n. 135, 2007, p. 101-102; BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADI 3489, Relator(a):  Min. EROS 
GRAU, Tribunal Pleno, julgado em 09/05/2007, DJe-072 DIVULG 02-08-2007 PUBLIC 03-08-2007 DJ 03-08-2007 
PP-00029 EMENT VOL-02283-03 PP-00425; and BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADI 3689, Relator(a):  Min. 
EROS GRAU, Tribunal Pleno, julgado em 10/05/2007, DJe-047 DIVULG 28-06-2007 PUBLIC 29-06-2007 DJ 29-06-
2007 PP-00022 EMENT VOL-02282-04 PP-00635)
54  See footnote nº 47. The express reference to the mandatory content of the prospective law is on the ruling 
summary: “…4. Action ruled valid, to declare the culpable default of the National Congress, and order that in the 
reasonable term of 18 (eighteen) months, it adopts all the legislative measurements find necessary to fulfill the con-
stitutional duty imposed by article 18, Paragraph 4 of the constitution, in which should be included the imperfect 
situations resulting from the unconstitutionality state brought by the inertia.”
55  See footnote nº 47.  Again, from the ruling summary: “...It is not about imposing a term to the legislative 
deliberation of the National Congress, but only about establishing a reasonable temporal parameter, considering 
the 24 (twenty four) months’ time fixed by the Tribunal in ADI’s nº. 2.240, 3.316, 3.489 e 3.689 for the state laws 
that created municipalities or altered their territorial limits continue valid, until the approval of the supplementa-
ry federal law, taking into account the realities in those municipalities.”
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a special regime that applies to payments owed by all levels of government deriving 
from a judicial order1. The general idea is to preserve equality among the creditors. 
Despite that constitutional regime, in periods of economic recession, many govern-
ments simply did not pay those debts, creating an enormous passive that was beco-
ming unpayable. The solution was the approval of a constitutional amendment, which 
authorizes the units of the federation (Union, States, Federal District and Municipalities) 
to parcel those debts, and other practices to transform them into a commodity that has 
market value. 
The first amendment – nº 30 – was found unconstitutional in 2010, 2 based on 
the main argument that it established differentiated treatments among government 
creditors. At this time, a new amendment was approved – nº 62– in the same subject, 
special regime of payment applicable to overdue governmental debts originated in a 
judicial decision. Again, the constitutionality of that new regime was challenged3, and 
the amendment declared void – but at this time, with a formal requirement by the Bra-
zilian Federal Bar Association of effects modulation. After all, the ruling declaring void 
the amendment nº 62 would simply return the matter to the previous regime, in which 
payment reveals itself impossible. Here is where a new experiment in constitutional 
dialogue is taking place.
The amendment nº 62 – ruled unconstitutional – contained provisions about 
how those credits, retained by former plaintiffs against government, could be traded in 
market, or could be renegotiated between creditor and debtor. Many of those clauses 
were found invalid due to various reasons, but the problem of ensuring those debts 
are payable remains. Therefore, in an opinion delivered by Justice Roberto Barroso, he 
is proposing that the modulation of effects might refer not only to a period, but also to 
the content of the clauses of the exceptional regime proposed for those overdue debts. 
The reason why Justice Roberto Barroso is sustaining that the Supreme Court can alter, 
by modulation, the payment regime of those debts, is to clarify to the National Con-
gress, what can and what cannot be done in the matter.
1  The Brazilian Constitution, Article 100 – “Payments owed by the federal, state, Federal District, or municipal trea-
suries, by virtue of a court decision, shall be made exclusively in chronological order of submission of court orders 
and charged to the respective credits, it being forbidden to designate cases or persons in the budgetary appropria-
tions and in the additional credits opened for such purpose.”
2  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADI 2356 MC, Relator(a):  Min. NÉRI DA SILVEIRA, Relator(a) p/ Acórdão: 
Min. AYRES BRITTO, Tribunal Pleno, julgado em 25/11/2010, DJe-094 DIVULG 18-05-2011 PUBLIC 19-05-2011 
EMENT VOL-02525-01 PP-00054; and ADI 2356 MC, Relator(a):  Min. NÉRI DA SILVEIRA, Relator(a) p/ Acórdão: 
Min. AYRES BRITTO, Tribunal Pleno, julgado em 25/11/2010, DJe-094 DIVULG 18-05-2011 PUBLIC 19-05-2011 
EMENT VOL-02525-01 PP-00054.
3  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADI 4357, Relator(a):  Min. AYRES BRITTO, Relator(a) p/ Acórdão:  Min. 
LUIZ FUX, Tribunal Pleno, julgado em 14/03/2013, ACÓRDÃO ELETRÔNICO DJe-188 DIVULG 25-09-2014 
PUBLIC 26-09-2014; and ADI 4425, Relator(a):  Min. AYRES BRITTO, Relator(a) p/ Acórdão:  Min. LUIZ FUX, 
Tribunal Pleno, julgado em 14/03/2013, ACÓRDÃO ELETRÔNICO DJe-251  DIVULG 18-12-2013  PUBLIC 
19-12-2013.
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The proposal is to signalize what kind of clauses the Court will find acceptable 
– after all, the Court in a different modulation exercise will fix those clauses. That tem-
porary regime will be valid for two years – allowing for enough time for the approval 
of a new amendment (the third one), now guided by the previous content delimitation 
undertaken by the Supreme Court itself.
This is a very bold proposal – and the reaction of the Court in the session when 
that idea was announced 4 – was of perplexity. The ruling was interrupted in March 19, 
2014 by Justice Dias Toffolli’s request for examination of the court’s file. In the meanti-
me (and this is undeniable), the National Congress has a clear signal of what was found 
unacceptable (in the initial ruling) and what, at least Justice Roberto Barroso finds via-
ble. Again, the ways in which constitutional dialogue is carried out between Parliament 
and the Supreme Court is not the same as an ordinary conversation.
All those episodes describe the experimental alternatives that the Brazilian 
Supreme Court has been applying in its rulings. Keeping in mind the idea that those 
experiments are being carried out in order to increase the legitimacy of the judicial de-
cisions, a critical analysis of the real potential to achieve that result must be made – and 
that is at the core of the considerations presented in the following Part.
PART IV – DIALOGUING DIFFERENTLY: A CONVERSATION WITH THE  
SOCIETY AND WITH THE LEGISLATIVE
In order to proceed with any evaluation about the dialogical experiences re-
ported above, a premise about the kind of constitutionalism that is being implemen-
ted in those rulings should be established. A classic vision, committed with a special 
deference to original intent and some sort of immutability as a necessary attribute of 
a constitution will be less sensible to the general argument that some kind of dialo-
gue – regardless the speaker and the conversational conditions – might be necessary, 
or even useful. On the other hand, an approach to constitutional interpretation ope-
ned to ideas like living constitution5, a constitution of many minds6 or democratic 
4  The sessions of the Brazilian Supreme Court are broadcasted in TV and in a special channel in YouTube, so the 
reaction of the other Justices on the bench can be easily seen.  
5  Even though the understanding of the expression “living constitution” might be itself controversial when it 
comes to the length of the updating that might be done through judicial interpretation without undermining 
the text itself; it is beyond any doubt that modernizing the constitutional understanding requires some dialog-
ical argumentation. For a broader view about the scope of the expression “living constitution”, see: REHNQUIST, 
William H. Notion of a Living Constitution. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, v. 29, n. 2, S.l.:s.n., p. 401-
415, 2006; ACKERMAN, Bruce. The living constitution. Faculty Scholarship Series, v. 120, n. 7, S.l., Harvard Law 
Review Association, p. 1738-1812, 2006; BALKIN, Jack M. Framework. Originalism and the Living Constitution. 
Northwestern University Law Review, v. 100, n. 2, S.l.:s.n., p. 549-614, 2009; and: STRAUSS, David A. The living 
constitution. S.l.: Oxford University Press, 2010.
6  SUNSTEIN, Cass R. A Constitution of many minds: why the founding document doesn’t mean what it meant 
before. S.l.: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 1, n. 3, p. 59-90, set./dez. 2014.
Vanice Regina Lírio do Valle
82 
constitutionalism7 will surely embrace dialogue as a useful, if not an indispensable 
feature of the judicial review. 
Updating constitutional agreements is a necessary effort – even in young cons-
titutions like the Brazilian one. The pivotal point here, which requires modernization 
is not that a long period has passed since its approval. The main aspect in still-young 
constitutions is that many times they reflect the possible constitutional agreements at 
the transitional moment – and might bring vagueness and event contradiction into the 
constitutional text. Therefore, it will be in the judicial review of the conceptual descent 
of a constitutional8 clause that refining the sense of that same constitutional clause – 
and therefore, building constitutional theory – will become possible. That process, in 
which constitutional meaning is informed by attempted conceptual descent, can cer-
tainly benefit from dialogue – and this is the premise in which those comments about 
the Brazilian experience in dialogical constitutionalism lies on. 
A) Different dialogue with different speakers
A first remark about the Brazilian experimentalism in dialogical practices in ju-
dicial review is a clear differentiation between the initiatives in which society is point 
as the main interlocutor, and the others in which the dialogue is mainly directed to the 
other power branches. That distinguishing might be observed though the opportunity 
of the invitation to dialogue, and through the procedural tool.
Inviting society to the debate over constitutional meaning is an initiative that 
the Supreme Court usually applies due to the technical complexity of the matter, sen-
sible moral aspects involved, or even a combination both. From the usage of stem-cells 
in scientific research, to the therapeutic interruption of pregnancy in case of an anen-
cephalic embryo, all those lawsuits combine technical issues and moral values, and this 
was an important reason to explore society’s current view in the matter. This is the re-
ason why the Supreme Court will usually hear from society as part of the preliminary 
instruction phase, through the summoning of a public hearing9.
Conversation with the other power branches – specially the Legislative bran-
ch – is treated differently. The parliamentary answer is expected to happen after the 
judicial decision, as a response to a formal invitation to react contained in the ruling, or 
7  POST, Robert. Democratic Constitutionalism and Cultural Heterogeneity. Australian Journal of Legal Phi-
losophy, v. 25, n.2, S.l.:s.n., p. 185-204, 2000; POST, Robert, SIEGEL, Reva. Roe rage: democratic constitutional-
ism and backlash. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, n. 131, S.l., Yale Law School Public Law & 
Legal Theory, Research Paper Series, p. 373-440, 2007.
8  The expression “conceptual descent”, meaning the effort to produce constitutional theorization through law 
making, in the search (again) of possible convergence, is propose in SUNSTEIN, Cass R. Incompletely theorized 
agreements in constitutional law. Social research, v. 74, n. 1, S.l.:s.n., p. 1-24, 2007.
9  Even though the Brazilian system also embraces the possible participation of experts and interested parties 
as amici curiae, public hearings are seen as a more inclusive arena of debate, because participating in those 
events does not require proper legal representation.
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as a possible reaction in an ongoing conversation about constitutional meaning. Regar-
ding to the tool, there is not a pre-determined instrument always used by the Supreme 
Court to promote that dialogue with Parliament. From the formal declaration of the 
urge to promote legislative deliberation to the establishment of normative criteria that 
might apply in the absence of the law, the Court applied many different techniques. A 
preliminary approach suggests that the depth of the intervention in the ordinary legis-
lative domain is dictated by the nature of the allegedly violated right: quasi-substitutive 
response when facing a fundamental rights breach, and less intervening decisions, en-
couragement and incitation in other matters.
That differentiation appears to be justifiable. Let us start with the opportunity 
differentiation. 
Engaging in conversation with the Legislative is something that should be occur 
considering separation of powers – understood not only as a “reserve of ownership” 
clause, but also as an institutional tool that recognizes that each branch is constitutio-
nally required and legitimized to perform specific functions. Therefore, if the Legisla-
tive deliberates and (by mistake) enacts a law that violates the constitution, a formal 
manifestation through a ruling must happen before the dialogical reaction might be 
expected. The other alternative – that the law was intentionally enacted in breach of 
the constitutional – cannot be considered as a possible formal choice of the Legislative. 
A system cannot be built from a pathological hypothesis.
On the other hand, if the legislative wrongdoing comes from inertia, the consti-
tutional duty of deliberation itself should be asserted, before a response might be ex-
pected. Once again, dialogue can only happen after a ruling. This is why it is understan-
dable that the dialogue between the Judiciary and the Legislative starts with a ruling.
Surely, in a procedural system just like the Brazilian, in which the session can be 
interrupted when the lawsuit is not entirely decided, the indications in the eventual 
known opinions might determinate some kind of reaction that can be also classified as 
a dialogical response, just as happened in the dismissal previous notice case, previously 
described. But here, the response happens in the realm of pure politics – as long as the 
ruling itself was not finished.
What about society’s contribution and the opportunity for it to be conveyed? 
Society, in the conflicts in which the Court is willing to engage in dialogue, is intended 
to contribute with its own vision and perception in the matter. It is not its role to provi-
de the proper solution, because the decision required from the Supreme Court is a te-
chnical one. Even though the community’s will and expectations explored in the public 
hearings are relevant to the decision10, this is not the only significant factor. Constitutio-
10  See footnote nº 28. Reaffirming the dialogical potential of those public hearings, the former Chief-Justice 
Gilmar Mendes pointed out that they usually involve “…themes that arouse big interest among society, and show 
high complexity, which requires not only the vision of the directly interested, but also from experts; this is the op-
portunity that mostly expresses that plural participation of all those sectors in that complex process…” (Overture 
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nal limitations might apply, and prevent adopting the rough societal desire; and this is 
why society’s contribution must come as a preliminary element to the discussion.  
Turning to the tool differentiation, it is also understandable. Society is called to 
amplify the disagreement among its members, increasing the understanding of the 
Court on the matter. Mapping the dissent is a necessary phase to be faced by the Court, 
in order to grant a response that might take into account all those pluralistic views. The-
refore, the openness of a public hearing when it comes to its participants seems to be 
a proper way to provide that broad discussion about a subject that, being controversial 
might be approached through different perspectives. 
The Legislative, on the other hand, when dialoguing with the Judiciary, must pre-
sent a single response – an institutional reply. Even though many participants contribu-
te to the deliberative process that happens in the Legislative, the answer itself is adjoin; 
and this is why an open arena, just like the one provide through public hearings is not 
required. 
Therefore, differentiating the dialogue attempts directed to the society or the 
legislative branch seems justifiable. A second aspect should be examined is the real 
ability of those experiments to promote dialogue.
B) Looking after dialogical potential in the reported initiatives
Addressing the real capacity of those experiments held in the Brazilian Supreme 
Court to promote constitutional dialogue, once again, requires the establishment of a 
premise: what should be called “dialogue” in that ongoing (and apparently, never-en-
ding) enterprise of revealing and updating constitutional meaning.
Dialogical theories about constitutional review have been, from the beginning, 
very controversial11. There is doubt around its real normative potential, and its ability 
to overcome the counter majoritarian objection. It is also debatable whether the inci-
tement expressed in a judicial decision might be understood as the initiation of a con-
versation – since the response of the possible speakers are limited. Asymmetry among 
the conversational parties is also indicated as a reason why interchange between the 
speech in the public hearing held in BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. ADPF 54, Justice-Rapporteur:  Min. MAR-
CO AURÉLIO, Full Pannel, ruled in Aril 12, 2012, ACÓRDÃO ELETRÔNICO DJe-080 DIVULG 29-04-2013 PUBLIC 
30-04-2013). 
11  Criticizing the real potential of dialogical theories to legitimize judicial review same theory (at least, in the Canadi-
an experience), MANFREDI, Christopher P., KELLY, James B.. Six degrees of dialogue…Op. cit.; MANFREDI, Christopher 
P. Judicial Power and The Charter: Canada and the paradox of liberal constitucionalism. 2 ed. S.l.: Oxford University, 
2001. p. 176–181; MORTON, F. L.; KNOPFF, Rainer. The Charter Revolution & The Court Party. S.l.: Broadview, 2000. 
p. 162–166. On the other stream, pointing out the danger to judicial authority in dialogical theories, see: CAMERON, 
Jamie. Dialogue and Hierarchy in Charter Interpretation: A Comment on R. v. Mills. Alta. Law Review, v. 38, n. 4, 
S.l.:s.n., p. 1051-1068, 2001. Denouncing dialogical theories potential to threat the checks and balances system (as 
long as they try to turn each power branch accountable to the other), see: LECLAIR, Jean. Reflexions critiques au su-
jet de la me´taphore du dialogue en droit constitutionnel canadien [Critical reflections on the metaphor of dialogue 
in Canadian constitutional law]. Revue du Barreau, v. 63, p. 377-420, 2003. p. 379, 402–412. 
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Judiciary and the society or the Legislative while providing judicial review is an impos-
sibility. All those objections doubt that the possible speakers are willing to engage in 
an interactive, interconnected and dialectical conversation about constitutional me-
aning12. The main question, therefore – primary to the debate about the legitimizing 
capacity of the constitutional dialogue – is if the outcome of experiments like the ones 
reported in the Brazilian Supreme Court are really able to provide such a dialogue.
Hence, we go back to the premise: what should be understood as dialogue? Exa-
mining the following question about the normative potential of dialogical theories do 
provide legitimation to judicial review, Tremblay proposes a differentiation to be made 
between dialogue as a conversation13, and dialogue as deliberation14. His conclusion 
is that conversation is intrinsically unable to legitimize a further decision, because this 
outcome (reaching some kind of resolution) is not an essential element of that particu-
lar form of interchange. Judicial review, therefore, will be only be improved through a 
deliberative dialogue – and not with a simple conversation.
That understanding that requires from dialogue a capacity to “…determining 
together which opinion or thesis is true, the most justified, or the best…” or else it would 
be a disqualified interchange labeled as conversation seems to be still excessively com-
mitted with the quest for the “final word”. If the only relevant dialogue is the one able 
to solve problems collectively, we will be transferring the search for the “last word” in 
constitutional interpretation, from the Judiciary alone, to that collective manifestation 
called deliberative dialogue.
Embracing dialogical theories as an useful alternative to improve judicial review 
requires the recognition that constitutional interpretation and updating is pervaded by 
“…an inevitable and permanent circularity…”15, reincorporating “…the long-term dimen-
sion of politics, which in turn has normative implications to how the interaction between 
courts and parliaments should be perceived…”16. This is why dialogue must be unders-
12  BATEUP, Christine. The Dialogic Promise-Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of … Op.cit.
13  “…In this sense, a dialogue involves at least two persons, recognized as equals, exchanging words, ideas, opin-
ions, feelings, and so forth together in rather informal and spontaneous ways. In a conversation, the participants 
have no specific practical purpose other than the general goal of exploring or creating a common world and body 
of meanings, learning something new about others, or discovering new perspectives…” (TREMBLAY, Luc B. The 
legitimacy of judicial review: The limits of dialogue between… Op.cit.).
14  “…In this sense, a dialogue still entails two or more persons, understood as equals, exchanging some words, 
ideas, opinions, feelings, and so forth, but the exchange is more formal and less spontaneous than in the dialogue 
as conversation. A dialogue as deliberation has specific mutual practical purposes: it aims at taking decisions in 
common; reaching agreement; solving problems or conflicts collectively; determining together which opinion or 
thesis is true, the most justified, or the best; or which particular practical view should govern actions or decisions…” 
(TREMBLAY, Luc B. The legitimacy of judicial review: The limits of dialogue between… Op. cit.).
15  MENDES, Conrado Hübner. “Is it all about the last word? Deliberative separation of powers 1. Legispru-
dence,:v. 3, n. 1, S.l.:s.n., p. 69-110, 2009.
16  MENDES, Conrado H. “Neither Dialogue Nor Last Word: Deliberative Separation of Powers III.” Legispru-
dence, v. 5, n. 1, S.l.:s.n., p. 1-40, 2011.
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tood in the broader sense, comprehending any kind of interaction that favors a real pic-
ture of the kaleidoscope of ideas and subjective approaches that must be considered 
in a ruling. 
If dialogue may be identified as a large spectrum of interactions between the 
Supreme Court and society or the Legislative, is it fair to say that all those reported 
experiments represent dialogue? Once again, the answer will be distinct considering 
each invitee.
1) Conversation with society
Dialogue with society is being held primarily through public hearings, as alrea-
dy established in item 4.1. Summoning and procedure have no strict rules, and are fixed 
a case at a time by the Justice-Rapporteur. Legal representation is not required, and 
in theory, everyone can be allowed to participate in such hearings. All those features 
apparently reinforce a first impression that this is an important way to provide dialogue 
– a conversational one, not specially driven towards building a solution, but still useful 
at least to understand the terms of disagreement. This will be the first impression – but 
first impressions can be deceiving.
Public hearings in the Brazilian judicial review do not have clear rules concer-
ning participation – who can take part and what is expect from them. The definition 
of the real contributors is a decision made by the Justice-Rapporteur without justifi-
cation, and there is no appeal against that choice. This is why, even if conversation is 
considered a kind of dialogue that may be useful to engage in constitutional meaning 
definition; the Brazilian experience with public hearings lack theorization. Restricting 
the speakers might be a practical requirement – but cannot be a decision driven by 
intimate beliefs that are not known or perceived by the public.
This is a first flaw that should be faced in the Brazilian experience – and be pre-
vented in future initiatives in other countries. Public hearings requires the development 
of kind of known selectivity that really provides the intended conversation – preventing 
a detour in the process that ends up limiting the discussion to only a privileged group 
or even to Public Administration itself. 
A second aspect that weakens the initiative is the absence of a parameter on 
how those informational inputs should be translated and taken into account in the fi-
nal decision. That void might bring two undesirable consequences. First, if one is not 
sure whether his participation, opinion or information will be considered (even if it is to 
be discarded), this will probably lead to disinterest and disengagement, undermining 
from the beginning, the dialogical potential. Second, if there are no parameters to how 
that information is to be brought to the ruling, it is possible that they will not be consi-
dered at all – and then the hearing will have turned into a merely symbolical initiative; 
in fact, simply meaning a public display of a pretended openness to other perspectives.
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All these fragilities in dialoguing with society through public hearings might be 
credited to the remains of a conception of separation of powers in which the Judiciary 
was seen as the neutral element of the system, immune to political influences. Enga-
ging in an open dialogue with different debaters is in fact, an unusual experience to the 
Judiciary, used to vertically decide, despite the aspirations that might be surrounding 
a lawsuit. The transition to a more democratic conception of constitutionalism itself – 
therefore, of judicial review – is still incomplete. 
2) Conversation with the Legislative
On the other hand, adopting the broad concept of dialogue above mentioned, 
will lead to the conclusion that the initiatives held by the Court in provoking the Legis-
lative’s reaction should qualify as valuable attempts. Of course, in order to agree with 
that approach, one should consent to the idea that accepting the Judiciary decision is 
a reaction, and allows some level of legal certainty around the parameters settled by 
the ruling. In that sense, the dialogical enterprise held by the Brazilian Supreme Court 
is bringing some results when it comes to rights enforcement. 
The problem – yet unsolved – is how to overcome the undesired result that in 
such cases, constitution is still violated, because the Legislative branch, when called 
to decide, is incapable or unwilling to do so. It is known the literature that explores 
the idea that in such cases, more them a simple acceptance; Legislative is “…foisting 
disruptive political debates off on the Supreme Court…”, “…avoiding political responsibility 
for making tough decisions as a means of pursuing controversial political goals…”17. Such 
behavior, even though might be confirmed by empirical evidence, is not among the 
constitutional possibilities appointed to the Legislative power – therefore, there is a 
constitutional demand to avoid that illegitimate choice.  
The main problem here resides not properly in an invasion of the Legislative’s 
competencies by the Judiciary. After all, if the separation of powers doctrine itself was 
conceived to prevent arbitrariness; it will be an absurdity to call it as an obstacle to judi-
cial intervention in the matter. The fragility in the quasi-substitutive solution resides on 
a subtle renunciation of a competency that the constitution reserved to an institutional 
apparatus based in the representative principle. This will undermine the constitutio-
nal engineering, allowing the Legislative and the politicians to refuse deliberation in 
a matter that the constitution did not offer them that alternative. Judicial intervention 
in such cases might eventually happen because of the urge in protecting rights – but 
cannot become an instrument for an unconstitutional and undemocratic resignation of 
competence by the Legislative.
17  GRABER, Mark A. The nonmajoritarian difficulty: Legislative deference to the judiciary. Studies in American 
political development, v. 7, n. 01, USA, s.n., p. 35-73, 1993.
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Restore political accountability is to be the second agenda point, in the the-
oretical development of those dialogical tools. Judicial rulings overcoming legislative 
inertia should always be provisional; reinforcing that attribute is a relevant task, in order 
to prevent the Judiciary from becoming a “peripheral mechanism”18 at the Legislative’s 
disposition, to crosscutting controversial issues.
Those critical observations should not be taken as a condemnation of the expe-
riments that the Brazilian Supreme Court is carrying on, and should not discourage that 
same attempt by other countries.  If permanence and circularity are inevitable attributes 
for a dialogical disposition, the initiatives here reported express the Court “first line” in a 
dialogue that is only beginning, and the criticism here exercised should be understood as 
a response – with the ultimate goal of stimulating and furthering the conversation. 
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